Reinventing old power: state, tribute, and indians in Puno by Hunefeldt, Christine
 
 
 
 REINVENTING OLD POWER: STATE, 
TRIBUTE, AND INDIANS IN PUNO 
Christine Hunefeldt 
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In 1824. toward the end of the Wars of Independence 
(1820-1825), Hiram Paulding, an English traveler reached 
Peru's Central Highlands. One ofhis stops was at the small 
town [villorio] of Gulcán, where he met its Gobernador 
and Alcalde: 
"With the insistence of a desperate man, I showed the 
Gobernador, an old Indian, my passport for the second 
time, and told him to read it. [The passport was signed by 
General Simón Bolívar, and it ordered all state employees to 
provide Paulding and his co-travelers with whatever they 
needed]. I told the Gobernador it would be risky for him to 
disobey the General's orders. I requested food and horses, 
and assured him that the Libertador punished anyone not 
providing the requested items. His fears and maybe the 
generous amount of money I offered to pay helped him 
make up his mind. Suddenly, the Gobernador remembered 
that there were some state-owned horses at his disposal 
and some goats on nearby pastures. Some hours later we 
had horses, anew guide, and the necessary 
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food to still our hunger. However, we were unable to obtain bread. When we 
asked for it, he emphatically answered: 'No hay.' [There is none']. 
Shortly before we were ready to leave, the old Gobernador carne up to me and 
insisted that I take my money back. Maybe he feared official reprimands, or sensed 
he was disobeying superior orders. At first he had lightheartedly accepted the 
money I gave him, but then, after consulting for some minutes with the Alcalde, he 
was worried and explained that it was improper to receive the money because he 
was the Gobernador of Gulcán. I tried to convince him that it was not a crime or 
immoral to take the money, but he stubbomly insisted that I take the money back. 
Finally, I mounted my horse and said good-bye. 
I felt perplexed at the old Indian's attitude. I had not received anything except the 
horses that really belonged to the state. Had he been receiving help from the state, 
the matter would have been different and simple. However, when he killed one of 
his own goats for us everything was more complicated. His authority as a 
Gobernador stretched over half a dozen miserable huts and he did not receive 
anything from the govemment. I simply could not understand why he had rejected 
the money, a sum of money that would have tempted any person owning more 
than he did"1 
1   "Con la fuerza de un hombre desesperado, presente mi pasaporte al Gobernador por segunda vez (un viejo indio) 
diciéndole que lo leyera y que desobedeciera a riesgo de él. Le requerí nos proveyera de comida y caballos al 
instante, asegurándole venganza del Libertador por cada momento innecesario de retraso. El miedo al castigo 
junto con el propio interés, pudo haberlo servido de estímulo, ya que me valí de una buena remuneración como 
premio a su pronto cumplimiento; el Gobernador, cediendo a su timidez y al sentido de obligación oficial, 
recordó, de pronto, que habían caballos del Estado a su disposición y que habían cabras que pastaban los 
campos, cosa que nosotros no podíamos observar. De esta manera, unas horas más tarde puso a nuestras 
órdenes un nuevo guía y caballos, asi como los recursos alimenticios para satisfacer los apetitos de la 
naturaleza; a pesar de todo, no pudimos obtener pan, a cuyo requerimiento nos daban la enfática respuesta de 
"no hay". A poco de llegado el momento de despedirnos, nos dimos cuenta de su escrupulosa delicadeza, 
observando su pundonor y su miedo de ofender a los altos poderes, si es que diera la mala interpretación a su 
conducta. Yo había puesto en sus manos una suma de dinero como compensación por lo que había recibido, a 
lo cual no puso objeción en el primer momento, pero, habiendo sido aconsejado por el "Alcalde" con quien 
tuvo una discusión de algunos minutos, vino donde mi preocupado, diciendo que no era lícito ni propio de él 
recibir dinero, ya que era el Gobernador del pueblo de Gulcan. Aunque no era cuestión de formalidades con él 
solamente, ni era un crimen ni un deshonor aceptar el dinero, no obstante, insistía, con obstinada perseverancia, 
para que yo tomara el dinero de regreso. Al fin, monté mi caballo y, por última vez, le dije "adiós". 
Me sentía perplejo en mis conjeturas referente a la singular terquedad del viejo indio. Yo no había recibido 
nada, excepto los caballos que, realmente, pertenecían al Gobierno: si él estuviera recibiendo ayuda del Estado, 
el asunto hubiera sido diferente y muy simple, pero desde el momento que había sacrificado una de sus cabras 
por mí, lodo era más complicado. Su autoridad se extendía sobre los 
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The Gobernador's hesitations to accept money, his consultation with the Alcalde, 
and his reading of the passport synthesize the difficulties of state-building in the 
decades following the Wars of Independence. During colonial times, Indians had 
paid money (tribute), not received money from the state. Although Indians were 
widely involved in monetary transactions, and were thus well-aware of the market 
value of money, accepting money from the state or from one of the state's local 
representatives meant reversing the order of things, and implied the danger of 
losing ones means of survival, land and protection. Paulding, a foreigner, was 
perceived to be at the intersection of a prívate moneyholder—from whom it was 
licit to accept money—and, because he was holding a passport with the signature 
of the current president, he was perceived as a representative of the state — from 
whom it was not licit to accept money. Although the Indian Gobernador was al so 
part of the state bureaucracy, because he collected the tribute from the Indians 
living in the half dozen huts in Gulcán, the traveler with a passport signed by Peru's 
current president, Bolívar, was a bureaucrat of higher standing. The flow of money 
went upwards, not downwards: from the Indian Gobernador, alcalde, cacique, or 
segunda, to the district Gobernador of the district, to the Subprefecto of the 
province, to the Departmental Treasury (Tesorería). Both levels of 
"misunderstanding", — who this traveler was (a prívate money holder or a state 
representative) and which the Gobernador s relationship to him was (higher or 
lower in the state bureaucracy) — and the final option of not receiving the money 
from Paulding, explain the Gobernador s decisions on both issues.2 
habitantes que vivían en media docena de míseras chozas y él no recibía nada del Gobierno; yo no podía 
descubrir el misterio de haber declinado aceptar tal cantidad de dinero, suma que hubiera tentado la codicia de 
cualquier persona en mejor posición que él". Colección de Documentos de la Independencia del Perú (from 
here on CDIP), tomo XXVII, vol. 2, Relaciones de Viajeros, Hiram Paulding, Visita a Bolívar en Huaraz, 
1824. 
2   What is surprising in the episode narrated by Paulding is the absence of a written record documenting the 
delivery of the horses belonging to the state. Usually, when an army officer requested animáis, food. or fodder 
for his troops. he signed a "vale" in which the delivery was registered. This "vale" could then later — when 
there eventually was enough money — be redeemed from the state coffers. Moreover. handing out state 
properly. could make Gulcan's Gobernador accountable for missing state property if he could not prove the 
destiny of these resources. Maybe, Paulding just forgot to mention he signed a "vale." but more probably there 
was no "vale". Tacitly, this means that the Gobernador handed out horses he miglit as well have kept for 
himself, that he did not fear governmental reprimands, and that he probably knew that the horses could never 
be tracked down. If he nevertheless gave the horses to Paulding without receiving money, it was the passport 
signed by the Libertador which explains his decisión. In doing so, he pul himself cióse to the source of povver, 
i.c. he saw himself as a participant in a political bargaining process. 
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For Indians at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the use of money was more 
than a register of their level of participation in monetary markets. It was also a 
political and a cultural register, or as Steve Stern (1987:289) put it, "con frecuencia 
nuestros registros "enmascaran" la lógica cultural y la función social de las 
intervenciones mercantiles andinas". ["Often our understanding of things mask the 
cultural logic and the social role of Andean merchantile participation"]. Money 
paid to the state had a different value than money used in market transactions. 
Much has been written about the tribute paid by Indians to the colonial state, and 
the meaning of the tribute in the wider contexts of colonial economic relationships, 
and the relationships between Indian peasants and the state. It has been stated 
that the tribute — tied to the silver production in Potosí — was a key element in 
dynamizing the internal colonial market, and in incorporating the Indian "ethnic 
economy" into the Spanish market economy (Assadourian, 1983; MacLeod, 
1984:219-264). When analyzing the relationship between peasants and the state, 
the dependency of the colonial state on the tribute payments has been underlined, 
as has—for the colonial period, and also for the Republican Bolivian state (Platt, 
1982; 1987:99-100)—the idea of a tacit agreement between state and peasantry: 
tribute payments represented the guarantee of the state's defense of Indian lands. 
Thus, the main reason why peasants were willing to pay tribute was this tacit 
agreement. 
From a microlevel perspective (Puno, 1825-1845), I will argue that Puno's Indians 
peasants rebuilt their perception of state hierarchies and their own relationship to 
the state, by interacting with the state's local representatives (Gobernadores and 
Subprefectos) on a daily basis. In the power vacuum resulting from the Wars of 
Independence, peasants observed Gobernadores and Subprefectos handle "state 
matters", especially tribute payments. Tributes represented the heart of the nexus 
between the state, local powerholders, and Indian peasants. The "tacit agreement" 
between state and Indian peasants was mediated by a complex web of power 
relations. If there had ever existed a "tacit agreement", Puno's history in the first 
decades after Independence was the systematic dismantlement of any such 
agreement. 
By describing the multiple uses and abuses of tribute payments, I want to illustrate 
how the access to Indian tribute, was important in a sheer quantitative sense for 
the new Republican state, but also to the reconstruction of local power relations, 
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and to define the relationship between local (provincial and distrital) powerholders 
vis-a-vis Lima's centralizing tendencias.3 Indian peasants had a saying in the 
reshaping of local power relations, and in doing so, in defining the relationship 
between local elites and the Peruvian state. In interpreting these multilayered 
relationships we can understand the changing circumstances under which Indian 
peasants were willing and or—increasingly so—forced to forward payments to 
a state unable and unwilling to grant any kind or protection. The spectacle of 
factionalism and peasants' actions, in tum, also dismantles the longheld image of 
Indians' political mutism and their retreat into self-subsistence. 
THE REPUBLICAN STATE AND THE INDIAN TRIBUTE 
The burden of the Wars of Independence (1820-1825) was carried by peasants. 
Troops from both sides (patriotic and royalist) more than once looted peasants' 
crops and animals for "war purposes", and recruited soldiers among peasants. In 
Junín and Ayacucho — the two battlesites where the Independence from Spain 
was sealed in 1825 — 30,000 men fought under the leadership of General Simón 
Bolívar, on one side, and Viceroy Pezuela, on the other.4 
In following the various subtitles of Basadre's Historia de la República for the 
first half of the nineteenth century, one realizes the dimensions of Peru's political 
instability in this period: the end of Simón Bolívar s "lifelong" presidential mandate, 
liberal constitutionalism between 1827 and 1828, military authoritariansm between 
1829 and 1833, civil strife between 1833 and 1836, the Peruvian-Bolivian 
Confederatíon (1836-1839), Restauration followed by new military confrontations. 
In each períod, more than one candidate disputed the presidency of the Peruvian 
state5 The count of various kinds of govemment documents political unrest, and 
unrest went hand in hand with what by all accounts was a weak state. In 1828, the 
3  Puno's history during this lime period contradicts Veliz's (1984) assertions concerning the "centralist tradition in 
Latín America". It of course also depends on how we define centralism, and the "discovery" of subaltern 
resistance makes this deflnition especially difficult. 
4  And, this number does not include the montoneras in many towns and communties on the coast and in the 
highlands, the many women who went with the troops. or the occasional goat for a European traveler.  
5  Massive uprooting, empty fields, and fiscal disaster was the bill of five years of war. According to Basadre, in 
this time period there were "tres asambleas constituyentes", "seis intentonas de regímenes constitucionales en 
diez y ocho años y tres autoritarias". 
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Peruvian president counted only on four ede canes and two capellanes, and there 
were only three Ministers: Government and Foreign Affairs (Gobiemo y Relaciones 
Exteriores), War and Marine (Guerra y Marina), Economic Affairs (Hacienda), 
with 11, 13, and 12 employees respectively (Basadre, 1961:438 and 195). Many 
more state employees existed in the provinces, over whom Lima's government 
had little or no control, because it had no money to pay for employees' salaries. 
The "salaries" Gobernadores, Subprefectos, and Prefectos largely depended on 
what they could exact from peasants under their tutelage. Thus, the "salary level" 
depended on the ability to impose exactions on peasants, and ability in turn depended 
on how peasants perceived these state employees (legitimacy), the local support 
networks these state employees could rely on (class alliances), the information on 
local production (control), and the availability of guns (enforcement mechanisms). 
These characteristics were not a given, but terrains ofcontestation. 
Between 1826 and 1854 the expected total annual average of tribute payments 
from all regions in Peru was 1 '300. 000 pesos, that is, approximately 20 percent 
of the state's revenues. Around 1850, the tribute represented not only about 25 
percent of the national budget, but also 100 percent of departmental budgets 
(Kubler, 1952). In a peak year like 1847, the percentage of the contribución 
indIgena of the total direct fiscal revenues came close to 85 percent of the total 
budget.6 In other words, the Republican state depended on Indian tributes as 
much as the colonial state had, and it comes as no surprise that in the years following 
Independence, provincial political and economic life, and state policies revolved 
around the access to tribute payments. Although the continued existence of a 
headtax based on race was perceived as an "abominable colonial remnant" in 
liberal rhetoric, fiscal necessity overrode such rhetoric. The tribute underwent 
intense debate and reformulation, but no matter how contribución was defmed 
afier 1825 in successive decrees, in essence it matched the colonial Indian tributeY 
That year frouus a total of I '569.084 pesos of fiscal revenues, 1326.931 pesos came from contribuciOn 
indigena (Basadre, 1968-70; Piel, 1982). 
Unless specificied differently in the wake of legal definitions and debates, I will use "tribute" as meaning 
the headtax paid by Indians, especially because as will be clear throughout, it were the ansounts of 
headtax that were paid throughout the century in spite of the rhetoric to the contrary, and in spite of 
the formal abolition of the Indian tribute in 1854. The forms changed, but the meaning and the 
amounts paid remained the same. 
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In 1821, General San Martín established two kinds of contribuciones, one secular, 
one ecclesiastical. Each Departamento had to pay a given sum of money on a 
monthly basis. In reaction to San Martín's decree, the Juntas de Municipalidad— 
in which the local notables participated—summoned in each departamental capital 
to evaluate who produced what and, consequently, assign who would have to pay 
how much to fulfill the quota. The Junta then recommended the Gobernadores 
(called Intendentes in 1821) to do the same intheir jurisdictions, and Gobernadores, 
in turn, were to summon provincial municipal juntas to do the same. For the 
contribución eclesiástica, instead of Gobernadores, Vicars had to organize 
payments. While Gobernadores and Vicars elaborated the lists of contributors 
based on what they knew about the property and income of individuals in their 
neighborhoods, the Subprefectos and the Prefecto exerted continued pressure to 
access the expected revenues. However, in December 1823 the rules changed. 
Following a Bolivarian decree, everyone was requested to pay the contribución 
única. When the members of the municipality met to discuss the new decree, they 
unanimously decided it was unrealistic: the implementation of the decree would 
substantially diminish fiscal revenues because production sites and levels on the 
coast were different from those in the highlands. The municipalities forwarded 
their thoughts to Bolívar, but by 1826 they were still awaiting an answer. Instead 
of a direct answer another decree was published. Now, there should be no 
contribución única, but a contribución rústica, and a contribución urbana. 
Thus the municipality's geographic-production concern was answered with a 
rural-urban dichotomy based on property. Any property tax presupposes the 
existence of property in the first place and then, also knowing what a property 
consisted of, and how much it was worth. In an economic setting where urban 
"industrial" workshops were family-owned, and where rural property was 
hazy because communal and prívate posession of land overlapped, and the value 
of an hacienda was assessed in terms of the amount of workers it could eventually 
draw, determining the boundaries and the value of individual property was, indeed, 
unrealistic. Even if the attempt was made to impose a property tax (in contrast to a 
headtax), much time would elapse until new tax registers were ready. 
Somewhat aware of the difficulties involved, the 1823 decree stipulated that 
until the new registers (matrículas) existed, everyone had to pay the 
contribución corriente, that is, everything should remain the same until it was 
possible to do otherwise. 
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The first new matrículas sent to the Departmental Treasury were returned because 
they did not specify what each property produced. When months later some 
corrected listings reached the Treasury once again, a new Supreme Decree (Decreto 
Surpremo) ordered that the percentage of tax on the total assessed value of each 
property be lowered. Consequently, the lists carne back for adjustments for a 
second time. 
In only fíve years, between 1821 and 1826, three different decrees concerning 
contribuciones were published, and each required a reversal of actions taken to 
implement the prior one. From these experiences, local authorities soon learned 
that any attempt to change the tax structure was an impossible undertaking and a 
waste of time. When confronted with state-issued decrees, municipalities and 
Gobernadores began arguing that more able people were needed to carry out 
tributary reforms, and that most peasant plots were so small they were not worth 
the paper they were registered on. From this dialogue between state-sponsored 
liberal ideas and local powerholders well aware of local reality and their own 
interests, soon, aconsensus evolved: areformulated contribución única was the 
preferred alternative. "Reformulation"—as deviced by local authorities—meant 
that "the Peruvians [!] who were tríbutaries under Spanish rule continue paying 
what they always had", that those from other "classes" with no property or known 
trade, that is, those who had to sell their labor force, pay the same as the first, and 
that those who had landed property (finca and hacienda owners, not peasants), or 
public industrial workshops (talleres) pay a percentage of their revenues. In this 
version, Peru's ethnic social structure had a tax counterpart: headtax for Indians, 
property tax for white hacieda owners, income tax for all others. "Peruvians"—in 
this text—were, of course, Indians; those who sold their labor force were Mestizos 
and Castas; those who owned large estates were whites. Quite straightforwardly 
the wording was a disguise to protract the contribución indígena and the 
contribución de castas. To implement these "changes", Visitadores should be 
sent out to each province to renew the matrículas, "following the oíd matriculas" 
("a manera de las matrículas antiguas"), that is, the colonial matrículas. Because it 
was not entirely safe to trust the Visitadores, Gobernadores and priests should 
help to elaborate the lists. 
State policies and intentions, and local perceptions ran in opposite directions. 
Decree after decree reached the Prefecturas to enforce new taxes and demand 
higher efficiency. Local authorities responded by demonstrating the decrees' 
inviability and criticizing the changes: 
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"we see continuous decrees and orders coming from Limahaving something to do 
with contributions, but those who issue these decrees have no idea about the 
desolation, the miseries, and the poverty in these pueblos after such a long and 
devastating war. This war left no untouched interstice on the whole continentOne 
of the most dramatic consequences of the War is that it has uprooted people 
forcing them to wander around, and with no place to go, maybe with the exception 
of the indigenous population. But even among Indians there are many who have hit 
the road and left their homes, in spite of their strong attachment to their land. And, if 
this is happening to Indians, how much more must those suffer who are not 
Indians. Not being used to pay any kind of contributions, but still being subjected 
to recruitment, the non-Indians prefer to embrace the life of savages, or untamed 
animals, moving from one place to the next, from one province to another, without 
the recaudadores having any means to assure they pay a contribution".8 
The chronology of fiscal reforms and the answers from members of the municipality, 
Gobernadores, and Subprefectos show the impasses of a liberal agenda during 
and after the Wars of Independence. What carne out of this dialogue between 
Lima's governments and local powerholders was the recognition that whatever 
the government proposed was worse than the colonial fiscal system. The most 
efficient way to collect contribuciones was the colonial way. 
On August 11,1826, a decree ruled that Indians between 18 and 50 years old 
liad to pay the same amounts as in 1820. Thus, the contribución — this time 
explicitly—was again the colonial Iridian tribute. However, (and this was the only 
"liberal compromise") when the tax on property was higher than the "personal 
tax", Indians, as everyone else, were required to pay 4 percent on the value of the 
property orindustry.9 To give tax collectors incentives, Gobernadores were allowed 
to retain 2 percent of the total tribute collected in the districts, and Subprefectos 
were allowed 4 percent. These percentages were also meant to pay for their 
salaries, the state was unable to provide. It meant: the "harvest economy" 
reinstalled.10 
8   Archivo de la Prefectura de Puno (from hereon APPu), Report from Anselmo Vera. Subprefecto of Abancay, 
1829. 
9 APPu, B-224 [these numbers correspond to my own listings. The Prefectural archive - until I arrived 
in Puno - was a heap of unsorted dirty papers], copy of mentioned decree. 
1 0 Very adequately MacLeod (1984:219-264) has called this a "harvest economy", an option that in 
colonial times and afterwards greatly diminished the state's control on regional politics and economic 
performance. 
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New problems soon surfaced. On June 9,1831, José Serna of the Contaduría 
General de Contribuciones advised the Ministro de Hacienda of the difficulties 
involved: 
"The smallest Indian personal tax in the whole Republic is never less than 12 
reales each semester [...]. The personal tax of all other castas is always the same, 
not more and not less than 12 reales. If— following the law—Indians or castas 
pay this same amount or more, they do not have to pay the personal tax anymore. 
The tax on property or industry is stipulated at 4 percent, thus, to pay 8 reales 
each semester, the individual needs to earn 50 pesos a year. In other words, in 
most cases [including Indians, castas, and even the military and bureaucrats] 
individuals would be paying a personal tax, because it is higher than the 4 percent 
of their income or property value".1  
But, "all the others" were not used to pay a personal tax, or had never paid direct 
taxes at all. Moreover, the personal tax was attached to índianness, and most 
people — especially mestizos and castas — rejected being fiscally treated like 
Indians. Beyond perceptions and self-perceptions, many castas had no fixed jobs, 
or land, something that made it difficult for tax collectors to get a hold of any 
stipulated tax, or even of the taxpayer himself. Physical mobility and occupational 
instability were—on the other hand — also mechanisms to evade tax payments. A 
reaction to these fiscal changes was recorded by the Junta Departamental in 
Cusco in 1832.12 The contribuyentes—the Junta argued — were "doomed to 
leave their places of residence, abandon their families, their pueblos, and homes; 
and, what for? .... to peregrinate, and to become vagabonds in other pueblos, 
and then not doing anything they increase the number of thieves and 
good-for-nothings [fascinerosos]". And, the Junta members added, "this is the 
dire picture that the experience and the practice have conveyed as the inevitable 
consequence of implementing the contribución de castas". The contribución de 
castas was abolished on June 16,1829, but the contribución indígena was 
reiterated by a decree issued by the Coronel de Ejército of Cusco the same day.13 
11  Archivo General de la Nación (from hereon AGN), Ministerio de Hacienda, Contaduria General de 
Contribuciones, O.L. 216:612-655. 
12  Biblioteca Nacional (from hereon BN), D 10763, Expediente sobre abolirse la contribución de castas.  
13   The comments of Anta's Subprefecto and the decrees of Cusco's Prefecto were published in El Sol del Cuzco, no. 
221, tomo 5, March 21, 1829, p. 49. 
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Beyond uprooting and misery, the state's own insecurities had much to do with its 
empty coffers. Often, contradictory or changing rules of how to fabrícate 
contributions hampered many (sometimes well-intentioned) efforts carried out by 
local authorities. Eventually they grew tired of watching these changes, and with it, 
the dismantling of their efforts inprevious months or years.14 
14   An especially dramatic representation of the meaning of the state"s backs and forths is illustrated in the 
description of Ramón de Echenique of vvhat had happened between 1821 and 1826 in Junín, vvhen answering 
to three points brought up by the Consejo de Gobierno, and seemingly sent to all Prefecturas. He wrote: "Al 
primero: que hay dos claces de contribucion, una secular, y otra Eclesiástica, ambas individuales, y arbitrarias. 
Estas se mandaron establecer en Noviembre del año 21 por el Grl. Protector, que asignó al Departamento de 
Huaylas. cuya capital entonces era Huaraz, la cantidad de 10.000 ps. mensuales. Para arreglar esta 
contribución el ex-Presidente Sor. José de Rivadeneira hizo una Junta de la Municipalidad y vecinos 
principales de Hitarás, conocedores de las demas Provincias, y por un calculo que formaron con respecto á un 
Comercio y producciones les asignó la cantidad que tuvo por conveniente a fin de completar los expresados 
10.000 ps mensuales. Comunicada esta resolución a los Gobernadores, que ahora son Intendentes, estos 
cuidaron de hacer igual operacion reuniendo a sus Municipalidades. El mismo método se observó para 
imponer la contribucion Eclesiastica, haciendo saver á los Vicarios de Provincia la cantidad que por cada una 
debían contribuir, y desde entonces la Prefectura no há cuidado demas, que de reconvenir a los Intendentes por 
el total de su continjente, estos a los Gobernadores, y estos ultimos a las Municipalidades, haciendose los 
enteros gradualmente hasta llegar á la Caja Departamental. 
El cobro se hace por medio de listas que tienen los Cobradores, firmadas por los Gobernadores y revisadas por 
los Intendentes. 
Por Diziembre del año 23 entró al mando el coronel Alcazar con el Titulo de Prefecto, en cuyo tiempo bino la 
orden para que se estableciese el proyecto de unica contribución sancionada en Bolívar: Sé hizo junta de la 
Municipalidad, y vecinos del primer rango, e instruidos de dicho proyecto declararon unánimes, que era 
inverificable, sin mucha perdida de los ingresos del Estado, con respecto a lo que producía la actual 
contribucion: pues el producto de los predios urbanos y rusticos en la Cierra de ningun modo era comparable 
con los de la Costa, a donde acaso habían estendido solamente sus miras los proyectistas y que sobre todo se 
hiciese ver al Supremo Gobierno esta notable diferencia, y si estubiese á su resolucion. Asi se verificó por el 
Prefecto Alcazar y no ha habido contextacion hasta la fecha. En el mismo año se agregaron al Departamento 
las Provincias de Jauja y Pasco [=cambios administrativos-jurisdiccionales], y el Sr. Grl. Prefecto Pardo de 
Zela les impuso el contingente que le pareció, segun el cálculo que formó para sí. De aquí resultó el ascender 
la contribución secular y Ecca. a la cantidad de 20.370 pesos mensuales. 
En seguida se mandó por el Supremo Gobierno poner en práctica el proyecto de contribución de predios 
urbanos y rústicos. Sé dirijieron por la Prefectura las circulares a los Intendentes, para que prosediesen con 
peritos los abaluos y remitiesen a la Prefectura los Documentos, para dirijirlos a la Superioridad, con animo de 
hacerle ver por un informe la deficiencia del caudal del Fisco, si se adoptaba el proyecto de predios en este 
Departamento: y que entre tanto nó cesase el cobro de la contribucion corriente hasta que el Supremo 
Gobierno resolviese sobre su materia. 
No ha llegado este caso, pues los primeros abaluos que remitieron algunos Intendentes, fueron devueltos por 
el Supremo Gobierno, previniendo se acompañasen con un estado, ó manifiesto jeneral, que resumase sus 
productos. 
Sé remitieron a los Intendentes para el efecto, y ya principiaban á mandar a la Prefectura sus abaluos en el 
modo indicado, cuando por Supremo Decreto se declaró una rebaja en la exaccion de predios. Con este motivo 
se les devolvieron sus abaluos, para que los modificasen, y aun nó han despachado, sin embargo de que no 
cesan las reconvenciones de la Prefectura; pero no puedo dejar de hacer presente á VS que el proyecto de 
Contribucion de predios parese inverificable: porque según se ha visto por los 
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Land and tribute went hand in hand in the discussions among local powerholders 
and members of the Congress. A "liberal fiare" was there, but it only lasted for 
about five years after independence, in the wake of which, fiscal necessity and 
image building, excluded Indians from liberal reforms, access to land, and 
citizenship, and sometimes even increased their tax burden to unprecedented 
heights. 
For eleven years since 1821, Indian peasants in Chucuito paid both the 
contribución rústica and the contribución personal, that is, 100.000 pesos 
above what the matrículas stipulated. This amount, "went into the pockets of 
caciques, subprefectos, priests, etc., without the Indians ever opening their 
mouths".15 In Chucuito, the annual rent paid by its 30 haciendas and all the 
ecclesiastical properties apportioned only 200 pesos a year. If the Indians paid an 
excess of 100.000 pesos in eleven years, this means that each year they paid 50 
times more than priests and hacendados together. In other words, there are 
indications that Indians continued to pay the tribute, large amounts of tribute 
payments never reached the Tesorería, and new forms of peasant extorsion evolved 
from the government's tribulations, vacillations, and distance. 
Bolívar was aware that to implement liberal ideals, many other aspects of the 
political structure as well as of the production process had to change. Firsthand, 
through his military experiences in the Andes, he had observed Peru 's urban and 
rural life. 
primeros Cuadernos la mayor parte de ellos, consta de Cuartillos, y otros quebrados de esta naturaleza, que 
para formar un entero, causaría mucha labor, se necesitarían de muchas manos auciliares, resultando al fin que 
no llegaría á abanzar, ni a la mitad de la Contribución corriente: á pesar de hallarse en el día en 10.130 ps. 
desde Enero del presente año [=7 months]. 
A lo segundo [deuda de contribuciones de Enero 1825 a Julio 1826] ...deben las Provincias desde el tiempo de 
su impocision, hasta la fecha 137.102 ps 6 reales [...] 
A la tercera digo: que la clase de contribucion unica que me parese mas productiva, adaptable a los Pueblos, y 
facil de recaudar, en que cantidad y sobre que bases, es la de que los Peruanos que eran de la clase de 
Contribuyentes en el Gobierno Monarquico, paguen una tercia parte menos de lo que pagaban en aquella 
epoca; que los de las otras Clases que no tubiesen bienes raíces, u otro giro conocido, que constituyan sus 
fortunas, sino solo su trabajo personal; paguen lo mismo que los primeros; que los que tubiesen fincas, y 
talleres publicos de industria, paguen un tanto á proporcion de lo que estos les pueda producir; que el cobro y 
entero de los productos, sé haga por semestres, pues estoy cierto que al menos la clase peruana mejor sé 
conforma con pagar el duplo semestral, que no cualquiera cantidad por exigua que sea, siempre que se la 
cobren al mes: y, sobre todo, que para arreglar esta contribucion debe nombrarse por el Supremos Gobierno un 
Vicitador en cada Provincia, que haga una nomenclatura, y taza á manera de las matrículas antiguas, en union 
de los Intendentes y Parrocos; no pudiendo fiarse esta operación á solos los Intendentes, porque acaso saldría 
imperfecta,..'".  
15    APPu, document 234, Report from the Visitador, 1832. 
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His initial attempts of reform were to resettle people, especially soldiers, uprooted 
and dispersed all over the country because of military recruitment, and to créate 
prívate property and a land market based on land distribution. Only then, a 
restructuring of tax impositions would become viable. However, seeking fiscal 
remedies by changing land tenure pattems hit the substance of local power relations, 
especially when changes involved Indians. Local powerholders resisted land 
redistribution as much, if not more, as they resisted tax reforms. Responses to the 
implementation of land reforn showthe systematic dismantlement of any effort in 
that direction, either because — so ran the arguments — they contradicted 
longstanding traditions and thus unleashed social unrest, or because these traditions 
were invoked by those who did not want or know how to operate reforms. 
On January 27,1825, Bolívar decreed that recruitment for the military should 
stop, to allow everyone to peacefully engage in agriculture and industry, and to 
avoid that those hiding or not venturing to return to their pueblos because of the 
fear of recruitment for the army, would eventually come back.16 Bringing people 
back to their pueblos was essential to politically and economically stabilize the 
country. 
Even earlier, in 1824, a nationwide measuring of land should have taken place, 
geared toward redistributing land belonging to Spaniards who had left the country 
and to caciques. The government wanted to know how much "empty" land there 
was, and to reallocate these lands to those who were without it.17 In 1825, Bolívar 
"abolished" peasant communities, and cacicazgos,18 the strongholds of ethnic 
production, in an attempt to create prívate land ownership and distribute land, 
especially to forasteros. 
16  Decree published in El Sol del Cuzco, no. 18, p. 87, April 4, 1825. 
17  A close Iook at the Expedientes de Reconocimiento de Comunidades, forwarded by peasant communities in the 
1920s, and kept in the Dirección de Comunidades of the Ministerio de Agricultura, that still await their 
recognition in large part because of the difficulties in defining their boundaries. gives an idea about how 
impossible this endeavour might have bcen in the early nineteenth century. Not even the deep agrarian reform 
promoted by General Velasco between 1968 and 1973 has solved this problem.  
18   The partial abolition of cacicazgos had already been decreed in 1783, as a consequence of the Tupac Amaru II 
rebellion. By then, neither viceroys, nor Gobernadores, nor judges could approve the creation of nevv 
cacicazgos, and only those already in existence would be kept, and only when they "had deserved" this 
privilege because of their loyalty to the king" (García Calderón, 1876:316). 
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In Congress, two projects to distribute land were discussed, one published in 
Trujillo on April 8,1824, and another in Cusco, on July 4,1825.19 These projects 
envisaged to grant land to Indians who had none, but without expropiating those 
who legally possessed land, in order to—the projectread—"avoid disturbances". 
Soon it was recognized that many Indians, especially forasteros, had no land, and 
thus could not be compelled to pay tribute. Thus, an effort was made to give them 
access to land. In November 1826 a circular was sent to the Intendentes 
(=Gobernadores), ordering them to carry out a census "without reservations", 
that is informing exactly how much communal land was cultivated by each cacique. 
After this had been established, and when there was available land, land in 
"appropriate proportion" should go to forasteros. To safeguard any "misallocation", 
this circular also mentioned that errors could be rectified during a subsequent 
Revisita.20 
In the few instances land reform projects were implemented, its consequences 
carne under fíre only a few years later. An observer from Cusco, who had himself 
participated in the 1824 and 1825 land reform projects, in 1827 repentfully 
concluded that the "philanthropy and humanity that had underlied the good 
intentions" of handing land to Indian peasants, had had detrimental effects on 
índians. Neither project granted índians the actual ownership of land. Property 
rights were limited: índians who gained access to land were not allowed to sell it 
before 1850, because it was hoped that by then the "clase indijena" would be 
better aware of its legal rights and have learned to manage their property, a 
discernment — according to the projects — they utterly lacked. In spite of such 
"thoughtful" limitations on property rights, the observer from Cusco thought that 
the "attempt of benefítting the índians needs to be revised, because if we think 
19  The proponents of these two projects were the deputees Don José Manuel Nocheto and Don Anselmo Quiros. 
These comments were published as a ''Remitido Interesante", in El Sol del Cuzco, no. 142, t. 3, September 15, 
1827. The commentator was well aware of peasant differentiation, and knew that an "equal" contribution of 4 
pesos a year sometimes was all a piece of land was worth, whereas there were other landowners (including 
Indian peasants) whose lands were larger and more productive. For them 4 pesos a year represented a 
"nimiedad". And. this taxation-differentiation dilemma was not solved in 1827, ñor had it been solved at the 
end of the century. What is noteworthy also is that he was aware of differentiation, but when it carne to 
construct a justificatory rhetoric, all índians were equal. Homogcnizing the "other" has been a longstanding 
practice to exert power and enact discrimination (see Mallon, 1996). 
20  This circular was signed by A. Gamarra, Prefecto of Cusco in 1826. The circular was published in El Sol del 
Cuzco, no. 102, 12/9/1826, p. 198. 
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about the longterm implications of it, combined with an assessment of the Indians' 
character, I am convinced that only bad things will result. There will not be a single 
Indian who will not sell his plot of land as soon as possible, and in less than ten 
years they will find themselves destitute from their main source of subsistence. 
Then, they will become vagabonds and err around, and it will be impossible to 
make them pay the contribución. The only thing that keeps them were they are is 
the small portions of land they cultívate with their own hands". Although the projects 
also stipulated that Indians could not sell land without a prior judicial report stating 
that is was absolutely necessary to do so, this — the observer commented—did 
not prevent Indians from selling their land: "the person who really wants to sell his 
land finds thousands of pretexts, and witnesses who will support him out of loyalty 
or because they have been bribed". To further underline his argument, V.L. [the 
anonymous writer of this article] commented that similar restrictions on land 
transactions had existed in the Ley 27, título 6to of the Recopilación de Indias. In 
spite of the strict enforcement of the Ley, Indians had always managed to sell land 
with ease. So, the commentator concluded, judicial intervention was inefficient, 
and it was to the Indians' and the state's best interest "not to benefit them [the 
Indians] with absolute property rights [con el don de la propiedad absoluta]". 
Thus, Indians were denied what they had never had. Furthermore, V.L. proposed 
not to distribute excess land at all, but that the state built a land reserve to enable it 
to distribute it as need arose. Since Revisitas and new matriculas every five 
years would register new tributaries as a result of demographic growth, land retention 
would allow the state to allocate land in exchange for contribuciones. In short, 
the "land question" (=Indian question) was a lukewarm attempt of land reform, 
and was understood as a means to exert state control and collect taxes. Very 
quickly. Bolivar's "land market" became a "regulated market" along ethnic lines 
for fiscal purposes. From philantropy the argument moved to necessity, and 
necessity meant protecting the privileges of local powerholders in the name of 
Indians' lack of understanding of their own best interest. 
Parallel to the shift from philantropy to necessity, a decree of July 4,1825, caciques 
[here equated with 'cobradores'] were ripped of their titles, authority, and land. 
The initial justification for this decree was that caciques extorted Indian peasants. 
However, quite soon, the state and local authorities realized that without 
cacique-cobradores, there were no tributes. Thus, former "extortioners" became 
tender and paternal guardians of Indians' happiness. On February 9,1828, El 
Sol del Cuzco endorsed this reinterpretation of the caciques' role and behavior: 
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"We well know that the caciques, also called cobradores, are the men who get the 
Iridian contributions for the state. In past times, these caciques were obeyed and 
respected by their Indians, like a child obeys and respects its father, because the 
caciques contributed to the happiness of these people, both in Heaven and here 
on Earth. They were the fathers, judges, and priests. Fathers because through 
tenderness they provided peace; judges because they corrected their faults and 
solved family quarrels; and, as priests in therayllus and parcialidades they induced 
them to follow the divine precepts. From here it follows that caciques contributed 
to the wellbeing of the nation. [...] Today we see otherwise. Today Pemvians [!] 
hold these positions, and they live outside the parcialidad' or the ayllu, and the 
collection of the tribute is in the hands of the mandones or segundas. The result is 
that now, Indians live in their ayllus in disarray, mingled with unruly people 
[malvados] that pervert them. Consequently, Indians have forgotten about God's 
precepts, and neglected their pasture lands; and, this is the reason why they no 
longer fulfill their tax obligations. The former caciques or cobradores are only 
interested in their prívate businesses, like the mingas on their lands, and other 
services they still receive from Indians because they are caciques".21 
The columnist added, that he had nothing against "Peruvians" or Indians being 
caciques or cobradores, but that it was necessary to "materially move" the 
parcialidades and ayllus, and thatto accomplish this it was necessary that whoever 
was in charge reside in the ayllus. Residence and patemalism were key to effectively 
make Indians pay. With the dismissal of the caciques an important link in the 
tributary structure was lost, and Indian peasants did no longer fulfill their duties as 
citizens of the new Republican order. The measurable "damage to the nation" 
represented one-fifth of its annual budget, and this was a decisive argument to 
advocate for the reinstallment of the caciques. 
Even such visible political figures like the Subprefecto of Calca, Don José Mariano 
Pumacahua Almanza y García, the son of Mateo Pumacahua, leader of the 
1814-1815 Indian-criollo upheaval against Spain, in 1828 carne under public 
scrutiny and was publicly accused of continuingto demand colonial payments 
("extorsions y obensiones coloniales") from Indians and vecinos.22 Caciques, in spite 
of Bolívar's 
21  El Sol del Cuzco, no. 173, t. 4. February 9, 1828. 
22  This accusation was published under "Verdades Desnudas" in El Sol del Cuzco, tomo 4, 1828, no page 
    no. 
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abolition decree, still held power and controlled communal resources. Now, 
however, attacks against Iridian caciques were staged accusing them of what 
everyone was doing anyway: return  to colonial forms of tribute exaction. 
Still, by 1838, the Subprefecto of Chucuito, Esteves, following arequest from the 
Gobernadores of Pomata and Acora (Rafael Loza and Manuel Catacora) based 
on a Decreto Supremo of August 29,1836, denounced portions of land formerly 
in the hands of Caciques. The 36 plots of land under scrutiny in Pomata were 
located inside the ayllus. Those in Acora had been rented in previous years to 
Vísente Vasquez, the son of a former Cacique. Until 1836, Vasquez paid rent; in 
1837 and 1838 he refused to pay, arguing that the fincas had belonged to his 
father. However, he had no documents to prove his assertion, and the fincas were 
"nationalized".23 As the abolition of cacicazgos brought with it an opportunity to 
gain access to cacical land (especially if no land distribution for Indians followed), 
a tension between fiscal priorities and land ownership wishes arose that explains 
the "slow death" of caciques. 
The difficulties in collecting tributes mentioned by V.L. were true, and rooted in 
how tribute was collected within ayllus orparcialidades. Tributes were not a 
once-in-a-time payment; they were registered almost daily in very small amounts 
of money, in the forra of actual money or in the monetary equivalent of producís or 
labor received. The Indian tribute—a contemporary observer commented—"is 
paid in the course of a semester following an age-old custom. The cobradores 
receive small amounts of five, ten, or twenty centavos each week from each tributary. 
Thus the coilection of the tribute for one semester at least takes five months in 
each semester".24 Without living in the ayllu or parcialidad a. weekly, or daily, 
coilection of small tribute payments was impossible, and so was the control on 
-.vhat Indians* produced and eventually were able to pay as tribute, and the draft 
oflabor. 
Following earlier recommendations forwarded by municipalities, in 1827, 
Visitadores were in fact send to the Departments. However, their task was not to 
elaborate new matrículas based on the reformulation of the contribución única, 
23  APPu. 1838-1843, document 311. request from mentioned gobernadores.             24   BN. D 
4569; and APPu, document 701. 
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but rather to make Gobernadores and Subprefectos pay outstanding and long 
accumulated debts to the state. As nothing seemed to work, fiscal desperation 
replaced reform attempts by judicial proceedings and prisons, and increased 
pressure on Indian peasants. 
THE FISCAL GAP AND THE SUBPREFECTOS 
Fiscal gaps and uncertainties preceded the declaration of independence in 1825. 
Debts had mounted in the wake of the liberal constitution of 1810, which as long 
as it lasted (1810-1815), abolished the Indian tribute. In 1827, when the Visitador 
and General Commissioner of the Ministry of Economics (Visitador y Comisionado 
General de Hacienda) visited Puno's Treasury Office, he noted that pending debts 
in the Libro Mayor of the Administración were due to the partial implementation 
of the 1810 constitution of Cádiz: 
"When in 1811 the Supremo Consejo [de Indias] abolished the Indian tribute, 
some of the pueblos in Puno offered to voluntarily continue paying the tribute. The 
Subdelegados then received these voluntary contributions. In 1812, however, the 
Spanish Viceroy [La Serna] following the Acta de Tribunales y Ministros of July 
11, 1812, ordered that the tribute should be paid, and for this reason, the 
Subdelegados saw their debts increase, because from that moment onwards they 
were made accountable for unpaid tributes according to the oíd matriculas. The 
Subdelegados were held accountable until they forwarded razones juradas, and 
the accounting office cleared their debts. Some Subdelegados cancelled their debts, 
others did not. For this reason, and because of the general circumstances many 
Subdelegados did not have a chance to regularize their accounts, today we find 
these huge debts in the accounting books, debts that really are chimerical". 
Thus, unpaid tributes predated independence.25 Between 1811 and 1818 the 
total registered amount of debt for Puno was 383.963 pesos and 4 1/2 reales. 
Even when subtracting "chimerical debts", that is, those the Visitador knew were 
unrecoverable bécause there had been bad harvests or because those responsible 
25  Also see Choquehuanca (1833), Jacobsen (1982), Tamayo Herrera (1982:76). 
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were no longer around, Puno still owed — up to the semester of San Juan 1826 
— 107.612 pesos and 3 1/2 reales for Indian tribute, out of a total of 250.442 
pesos and 3 reales, of its total fiscal debt. Thus, about 43 percent of Puno's 
departmental debt to the state were Indian tributes. 
The Visita carne along with an unrelenting persecution of the Subprefectos (the 
former Subdelegados), responsible for entering tribute payments to the Tesorería. 
Subprefectos, in turn, depended on distrital Gobernadores to collect the tribute 
from caciques-cobradores in smaller units (parcialidades, ayllus). While trying to 
impose fiscal order, the government also restructured how and when the 
Subprefectos had to collect the tribute. Thus, the state's efforts to recover unpaid 
debts affected local power relations and its effects went all the way into the homes 
of peasant families. 
To restructure the collection of fiscal revenues, the state recommended that 
Subprefectos and the cobradores they chose, should "proceed to collect the tribute 
with softness, without using force, so that the tribute would provoke hatred from 
those obliged to pay it". However, Subprefectos could, if necessary, proceed 
against those who did not pay in time [morosos] by seizing and auctioning their 
belongings or sending them tojail. Subprefectos were not allowed to change 
matrículas on their own account and without the approval of the Contaduría 
General de Contribuciones, the Prefectura, and — if none of these entities could 
be consulted—the Presidency itself (Casa de Gobierno). The tribute collection 
should start one month before the end of the semester in which it was due, and the 
whole amount should enter the Tesorería—at the latest—two months after the 
end of the semester. If the due amount remained unpaid after four months, a lawsuit 
was filed against the Subprefecto and his guarantors [fiadores], he would be fired, 
and not allowed to hold any public office in the future. The tribute had to enter the 
Tesorería as "moneda corriente".26 
The new matrículas had to include all absent peasants, and — for tributaiy 
purposes—peasants would only be considered absent, when the military officer 
in charge of recruitment had certified a peasant served in the army. Moreover, the 
list of absentees required the Prefecto's approval and signature before it was sent 
26  APPu, copies of decrees of August 11, 1826; and the Congress approval of May 21, 1828. 
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to the Ministry in Lima When there was no certifícate and/or the signature, "absent" 
peasants were registered as tributaries, and the Subprefecto was held responsible 
for the non-payment of absentee peasants. Such detailed specifications conceming 
soldier-peasants reveal that Bolivar's decree concerning the halt of recruitment 
was either short-lived or never implemented. In a trend of toughening rules, 
Subprefectos who had not collected the tribute due to bad harvests, or natural 
disasters, had to document when and with what consequences these disasters had 
occurred before they were exempted from fiscal responsibility.27 
Such strict and precise regulations were based on fiscal necessity, but also on a 
current perception of the "administrative deficiencies" of those in charge of collecting 
tributes, especially Gobernadores and Subprefectos. In his visitto Peru's Southern 
departments, the Visitador de Hacienda. Don Evangelista Yrigoyen, underlined in 
his report that the "origin of all evils is that those entrusted with tribute collection 
are apathic, inert, and lenient, and that their underlings, imitating such a behavior, 
are but useless followers". As a consequence, he argued, outstanding debts "had 
been completely neglected, and everything is following apath of general decay". 
The Visitador suggested to replace all local powerholders, because "it would be 
difficult to transform those presently in charge, and make them forget their bad 
habits, which essentially reside in their narure".28 Even if the Visitador 's judgment 
was right, his proposition would have met obstacles, not only because those in 
power would naturally resist their dismissal, but also simply because in some places 
there were few people who could read and write and, thus, able to register 
tributaries, carry out land measurements, or report to Lima's government.29 
At the level of appointments to bureaucratic positions, Lima's government had 
little to propose, and there was also little it could do. In spite of efforts to increase 
efficiency, loyalty, and order, appointments continued to be self-appointments, 
very much in line with what General Sucre had opted to do from the very beginning, 
that is, in 1825. Then, he informed the Ministro de Gobierno, that he had appointed 
Prefectos in Arequipa, Cusco, and Puno, but he had authorized the Prefectos to 
nominate all other state employees. Although Sucre recommended that persons 
--------------------  
27 BN, D 11923, Funciones de los Subprefectos (2ff), 1828. 
28 AGN, Ministerio de Hacienda, O.L. 164:1706-1713. 
29 APPu, Comunicación del Intendente de Carabaya, Mariano Ponze al Prefecto, July 9, 1827; and 
November 12, 1827. 
 
30 
REINVENTING OLD POWER 
with proven ability and patriotism be preferred to do the job, he knew that "factional 
appointments" predominated, and that this allowed for a reproduction of 
factionalism, the continuation of disorder, and a bad public opinion of the 
government.30 
Inertia and illiteracy were sources of inefficiency. However, as Sucre knew, when it 
carne to implement or follow state mandates, the structure of local power relations 
put "inertia" and "illiteracy" in a different light. Inertia and illiteracy also were 
mechanisms of deceit. The lawsuit filed against Subprefecto Don Pedro Miguel de 
Urbina, illustrates the point.31 In 1827, the Tesorería requested that Urbina pay 
his tribute debts (21.507 pesos and 6 reales), otherwise he would be fired and his 
guarantors called in. That year, fiscal needs were especially urgent. The Pichincha 
Bataillon was stationed in Lampa, and the Tesorería had no other means to pay 
the soldiers, provide them with food, or buy fodder for its cavalry than resorting to 
outstanding tribute debts. But Urbina did not pay. Soldiers began deserting, assaults 
on peasant property followed, and fínally to avoid further disasters, the Bataillon 
was moved to a more promising site. In the lawsuit against him, Urbina responded 
that most of his debts to the Tesorería originated when he was Subprefecto in 
Chucuito in previous years. There—he argued—the state had decided to move 
him on to Lampa because of animosities with members of the local elite in Chucuito, 
which had also prevented him from gathering outstanding payments from "his" 
Gobernadores.32 Afew months later, Urbina forwarded several documents to the 
Tesorería (libramientos a favor del Tesoro) that showed that during his stay in 
Chucuito he had invested in public services an amount higher than the tribute 
money.33 It was probably this "transaction" which then allowed Urbina to become 
the Subprefecto of Lampa. 
The absence of money is salient in this dialogue between the Tesorería and the 
Subprefecto. Money was mentioned as a debt, and later as an investment, but it 
never really 'existed'. What I, of course, would like to know, is why the Subprefecto 
unable to collect the money in Chucuito because of his quarrels and his dismissal, 
30   Letter from Sucre to the Ministro de Guerra. Puno. 2/1/1825, in CDIP, tomo V, vol. 6, pp. 268-269. 
3  1         APPu, Tesorería Pública to the Prefecto, April 13, 1827. 
32   APPu, several writings and petitions from the Subprefecto Urbina to the Prefecto: February 10, 1827; 
 February 12, 1827; March 21, 1827: August 1, 1827: October 17, 1827, documents 219-224, and 259.    
33   Archivo del Palacio de Justicia de Puno (from hereon APJPu). Expediente de cobranza contra el Sor. 
 Intendente de la Provincia de Chucuito, D. Pedro Miguel de Urbina, 1827. 
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was shortly afterwards able to spend more money in public services. Two answers 
are likely. Either Urbina was telling the truth and paid (at least partially) for public 
services out of his own money, or he was cheating, pocketed the money, and 
when caught invented public investments (with forged documents) to cleanse his 
name and access the Subprefectura in Lampa. The first altemative would signal a 
"local identity" even at the risk of losing one's own money; the second altemative, 
would reveal how Subprefectos accessed tribute payments, circumvented state 
control, and regained a political position to repeat the cycle. Whatever really 
happened, the "cleansing-process" was necessary; the Subprefecto's appointment 
depended on the state. Beyond "legitimacy", however, Subprefectos manipulated 
money and arguments. 
Four years later, in 1831, Urbina was still held responsible for outstanding debts, 
but matters were less severe. Intense pressure subsided as the state gradually 
relinquished portions and percentages of outstanding debts, or made monthly 
payments possible after recognizing that it would be impossible to ever recover 
even the "non-chimerical" debts. In Urbina's case, when the Treasury finally decided 
not to admit the public service argument and to make his guarantors pay, Urbina 
requested his transfer to Arequipa for health reasons, and offered to repay his 
debt with 400 pesos a month. The Treasury accepted his offer. Assuming that 
Urbina was a jerk who would fake disease to escape the fiscal grip, and pocketed 
the tribute money, the monthly 400 pesos he offered to pay represented a 2.0 
percent monthly interest on 21.406 pesos. This was simply the cheapest capital 
available, or given the economic and political circumstances, the only capital 
available. 
Between 1827 and 1835, Urbina (in Chucuito and Lampa) was not the only 
Subprefecto who was in trouble with the Tesorería. In Carabaya, the Tesorería 
attempted to involve the Subprefecto's guarantor's to recover outstanding tribute 
debts. Soon, the guarantors, conveniently, ran out of resources. In Azángaro, the 
Treasury found out with amazement that against all legal stipulations, the 
Subprefecto's guarantors were Indians who had but a few llamas and cows, and 
small plots of land.34 In Huancané, the Treasury proceeded to auction one of the 
34  APPu. documents 375, 372, reports from the Tesorería, 1827-28. 
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Subprefecto's haciendas, and—not surprisingly—nobody showed up to buy it. 
The Treasury was forced to rent it, and the new renter was a "dependiente" of the 
Subprefecto. 
The confrontations with the Treasury involved Puno's five Subprefectos, and 
illustrate the Subprefectos' success in circumventing the state's attempts to get a 
hold of local revenues. Subprefectos had strong reasons — fundamentally their 
own prívate interests—to resist state control, and they found mechanisms (including 
disease, transfer, and 'procedural errors') to escape state control, without 
jeopardizing the legitimacy provided by the state. At the end, the Tesorería quite 
bluntly admitted that "all recipees provided by the Tesorería die in the hands of 
local authorities because they alone know whathappens in the places they live".35 
What the Subprefectos had "learned'' in the years after independence, became an 
established routine in the following decades, a routine that in the wake of the 
Confederation (1836-1839) encountered an even weaker state. 
A new wave of prosecution against Subprefectos was launched by General Nieto 
in 1834, and more strongly by Mariscal Santa Cruz. Santa Cruz created the 
Contaduría de Rezagos specifically and solely in charge of persecuting and 
prosecuting debtors. In 1839, the Subprefectos of Chucuito, Lampa, Huancané, 
Azángaro, and Ayaviri36 were ordered to leave their positions after paying the 
tributes for the pending semesters of Christmas 1838 and all they had so far 
collected for the semester of San Juan 1839.37 Some worried voices also carne 
from Sandia, a scarcely populated region.38 The abuses that led to their dismissal, 
especially in Chucuito, even merited a recrimination signed by Peru's President: 
35  APPu, Relación de deudas sobre 101 deudores antiguos a 20 ramos en "cobrables e incobrables". Albeit with 
different arguments, as we will see. some Gobernadores learned the same strategies. In a sense there was a 
downward prolongation of the leamings of how to deal with an intrusive state. In 1833, the Comisión 
Permanente de la M. H. Junta Departamental of Puno in a letter to the Prefecto, transcribed the complaints of 
the priest of Pomata, concerning the abuses and default of Pomata's Gobernador, To extoit the Indians, the 
priest wrote, "the Gobernador did it in the ñame of the state, also to get a hold of their food supplies for small 
prices and thcn engage in commerce with them". APPu, March 27, 1833: document B-359. 
36  It is somewhat strange to find Ayaviri listed as a province. Ayaviri gained the status of a province only early in 
the twentielh ccntury. 
37   APPu, February 26. 1839; document B-340. 
38   APPu, July 23, 1833; document 398. 
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"I have been informed that Casiques and Gobernadores of the Province of 
Chucuito, trespassing all humanitarian feelings [con desprecio a la humanidad], 
and contravening our liberal instituüons, still use many Indians to provide them 
with free labor, following colonial corruption, and exert many pressures on them, 
to a point of putting them under the most horrendous conditions of slavery". The 
President ordered "that these abuses be torn out by its roots".39 
However, only a few months after its establishment, the Contaduría—following 
the traces of the Tesorería in 1827 — recognized that it "fiad not been possible to 
even obtain one cent from those classified as insolvent. Now the Libros Mayores 
register the same amount of debts as prior to the establishment of the Contaduría".40 As 
a consequence, debts augmented. Following calculations forwarded by Puno's 
Prefecto in 1835, Puno's five provinces owed 112.284 pesos and 3 reales of 
"new debt". In 1840, the Ministerio de Hacienda, had a debt record for Puno in 
the amount of 403.175 pesos and 1 real.41 
In the meantime, the state had no money, but neither did the Departamento. In a 
letter to the Ministro del Tesoro, Puno's Prefecto invoked the state's help to pay 
for local expenses, because what he obtained from renting state lands, and the 
tomín were insufficient to cover expenses. Moreover, he argued, municipal 
resources [propios y arbitrios, mojonazgo] were so low, they were insufficient to 
pay for the salaries of municipal secretaries (Secretarios Municipales).42 Increasingly, 
the power of the state diminished, and the power of those who had direct access 
to Indian peasants' tribute increased. In the 1840s the Prefecturas were facing 
bankruptcy, and the lack of tribute funds not only affected national and 
departamental budgets, but also other entities and institutions, including the military 
(as seen above) and the church. 
Since San Martin's contribución eclesiástica was only randomly implemented, 
the church continued to depend on state allocations. In 1830 (?43), Lima's 
archbishop protested: 
39  APPu, September 17, 1839; documents B-353, B-362, 428 and 429, Communications from Lima. 
40 APPu, Relación de deudas dobre 101 deudores antiguos a 20 ramos en "cobrables e incobrables". 
41 AGN. O.L. 279:361-362, Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas, Proyecto de un método para la liquidación de las 
cuentas pendientes en el Tribunal. 
42  AGN, Beneficencia de Puno. 
43   This is my guess, the document has no date. 
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"I cannot omit mentioning that when the Cortes Españolas abolished the Indian 
tribute, from which the asignación sinodal was paid; Archbishop Dr. D. Bartolomé 
de las Heras [...] wrote a strong letter to the king, requesting that the missing 
payments be covered withtithes [masadecimal]. Since nowadays the Indians pay 
the same amount as the former tribute in the form oí contribución única, Your 
Excellency should provide that the priests get the masa sindodal from the 
contribución'. And, he added, that if customs were so strong, they should be 
even stronger in the highlands, where customs silence the laws",44 implying that as 
nothing had changed the church's privileges — especially those tied into the 
continuation of tribute payments — be restored. 
And, in a sense, the archbishop was right: there had been many new laws and 
attempts of reform but customs (and one should add convenience) silenced them 
all. 
SILENCING THE LAW: MATRICULAS AND GOBERNADORES 
Fraud against the state and peasants began in the very way the collection of tribute 
occurred. In parcialidades and ayllus, it was the Gobernadores' turn to cut out 
their share of the tribute. In 1839, Don Domingo Choquehuanca (1839:60-61) 
from Azángaro, and a member of the Indian elite, described the role of 
Gobernadores, Segundas, and Hilacatas in the ayllus. The Gobernadores 
appointed Segundas or Hilacatas, in charge of the collection in three or four 
ayllus, and these Indian cobradores summoned the tribute payers for a given time 
and in a given place. With the matrícula in hand, the Gobernador joined this 
assembly, and called each tributary by his name. During this meeting the Gobernador 
also listened to complaints. When the tribute was paid, the Gobernador handed 
each individual a receipt for the amount paid, and the Hilacatas or Segundas 
received a list of taxpayers and a copy of the receipt. Some Indians paid their 
tribute in one installment, those who did not would show up to mass on the following 
Sundays and pay the outstanding amounts to Hilacatas and Segundas, or directly 
to the Gobernador, who certainly also attended mass. 
44  Archivo Arzobispal (from hereon AA), Comunicaciones Oficiales de Curas, L 4. 
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The smoothness of Choquehuanca's description contradicts peasants' experiences 
(described in the following section), but it lays open the interstices that made fraud 
possible. Fraud was a procedural fraud: receipts were not always handed out, or 
were forged receipts that could later be disqualified; for many reasons, an Indian 
may not want or be able to show up on the stipulated day or to Sunday mass, and 
then be subjected to persecution and imprisonment, eventually even losing his 
possesssions; the matrícula the Gobernador held in his hands, could be outdated 
or simply wrong, thus giving him the possibility to exact payments from those, or 
their relatives, who for reasons of age, absenteeism, sickness, or death, were 
exempted or no longer could pay. 
Matrículas preserved in the AGN,45 carefully register tributaries' age, that is, 
whether they were "próximos" (under 18), or "ancianos" (over 50), in addition to 
"valetudinarios" (sick) and "ausentes" (absent). They also include information on 
family members, their place of residence (hacienda, ayllu, pueblo, isla), the status 
(originario or forastero), and the amount paid. In colonial times, and through 
"revisitas" these matrículas were updated every five years to account for 
demographic changes, epidemics, bad harvests, migration, etc. The growing unrest 
since the beginning of the nineteenth century, in addition to the high geographical 
mobility the wars of independence brought about, these matrículas were utterly 
outdated by the end of the wars. In spite of the state's orders that Subprefectos 
update these matrículas, and that a special "Junta de Matrícula" was created, the 
tributary lists show few changes between 1800 and 1853. This is evidence to the 
fact that matriculas are almost useless to assess demographic changes among 
Indian peasants in the first half of the nineteenth century, and that Subprefectos 
and Gobernadores had an incredible leeway in interpreting local changes their 
way: they could request payments from those exonerated, or exclude those subject 
to payment by receiving an equivalent or higher payment (bribe) from those 
excluded. Exclusion was just the other side of the same coin, but either way, 
payments in excess from those arbitran ly included and payments from those paying 
for exclusion was tributary money never accounted for in official statistics. Ovando 
45    The Matriculas for Puno in the AGN are incomplete, and end in 1853. i.e. one year before the Indian 
tribute was abolished. Their "disappearance" is symptomatic in the face of the tribute exactions after 
1854. Probably some Gobernadores or Subprefectos kept this register for their own records, and 
officially the state relinquished its control with the abolition. Thus, the "disappearance" in some way 
is evidence to local powerholder increased power in the provinces. 
36 
REINVENTING OLD POWER 
(1985:47) synthesizes tiie typical forms ofmatrícula fraud: a. exact tributes without 
registering it; b. exact tributes from "reservados" and "próximos;" c. exact a higher 
tribute than the one stipulated for the locality and the time period; d. exact tribute 
from non-Indians; and, e. request payment for exonerations. 
When occasionally complaints reached the Prefecto or even the President, and a 
Gobernador or a Subprefecto had to answer accusations, the most that happened 
was that he was given another opportunity to justify his deeds, or in the worst 
case, he was admonished and requested to behave better.46 In their allegations, 
the Gobernadores and Subprefectos often managed to turn around the argument, 
by showing that it was the state's fault that no new matrículas were established: 
the printed matrículas had not arrived in time, the Tesorería forgot to register the 
guarantors, or they had done everything requested from them, but thematrícula 
was lost.47 Until a more stringent reaction followed many years could elapse, and, in 
the meantime, Gobernadores and Subprefectos could be elsewhere and claim 
that their predecessors or successors were responsible for whatever had happened. 
Before the mysteries of individual responsibilities were deciphered, many more 
years of inquiry awaited local judges, especially if they themselves accepted bribes. 
Many complaints never reached the higher echelons of the state bureaucracy. 
Beyond the fraud linked to registration in the matrículas, another "weapon" in the 
hands of Gobernadores and Subprefectos was recruitment forme anriy. Recruitment 
— endorsed by the state — was the "legitímate" weapon to frighten unwilling 
peasants. Sending a peasant as a recruit to the army was a mechanism of 
intimidation, a way to silence peasants on their way to denounce a Gobernador s 
wrongdoings and unwilling to particípate in clientelistic networks,48 pay more, 
pro vide them with additional services, or even to hand over their lands.49 Again, 
the state was there as the source of power, but it had no effective means to enforce 
its decrees orto control the arbitrary use of its decrees 
Although it is impossible to determine how much more Indian peasants paid, some 
evidence suggests that "reinterpreting" matrículas was a common procedure, 
and it is possible to have a glimpse as to how much an unscrupulous Gobernador 
46 APPu, documcnts 274, 275. 
47 APPu, document 269. 
48 APPu. document 265. 
49 APPu, document 270. 
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could accumulate by resorting to these procedures. In 1826-1827, the Gobernador 
of Pusi (Huancané) described these same procedures when evaluating the 
performance of a cobrador, and he also mentioned, that this was a "common 
practice". As a follow up to this denunciation, the Intendente Agüirre of Huancané, 
inquired with the peasants in all districts of Huancané, and calculated that the extra 
amount peasants had paid to his predecessor for "reservados" and "muertos" 
amounted to 2.000 pesos. In 1829, the Indian tribute for the whole provmce of 
Huancané was 33.248 pesos and 6 reales that is, the extra 2.000 pesos represented 
approximately 6 percent of the province's tribute. Together with the legally deductible 
percentage for Gobernadores (2 percent), the total "accumulation" in one semester 
was approximately 3.500 pesos, an amount twice the president's salary that year. 
This was the monetaiy expression of extorsions through the matrículas, and it 
does not include the realms of non-monetary extorsions: labor and products. This 
rough estímate shows the economic advantages of apolitical position, and explains 
the struggles over these power positions in the ranks of local elites. 
During the periods of mounting fiscal pressure from Lima around 1827 and then 
during the Peaivian-Bolivian Confederation, the "nonnal cycles" of extortion were 
interrupted and led to changes in options and attitudes. These were periods in 
which Gobernadores lost the monopoly of exploiting Indian peasants and, 
consequently, were forced to defend Indian lands, labor, and money. Only too 
well did Gobernadores know that they could maintain their extortions only if others 
competing for the same resources could be kept outside the ring. Every military 
recruitment order from the state, or from the Prefectura, diminished the number of 
tribute payers; every request for food or fodder diminished the amount of resources 
Gobernadores could procure for their own shack. Peasant life and production 
were not boundless. 
The defense of Indians by some Gobernadores seldomly was an altruistic 
determination. By defending Indians' rights, Gobernadores rescued their command 
of peasant resources. Once they saved their tributarles from recruitment, they 
could demand additional payments as a sign of gratitude and obligation. Once 
they released a peasant from the pressures of a neighboring hacendado interested 
in a peasant's labor or land, the peasant was "indebted" to the Gobernador, or 
more precisely, owed eternal gratitude and obedience. 
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Clashes between Gobernadores and hacendados on behalf of Indian lands 
transpired. Cabanilla's Gobernador, Manuel Felipe Agramonte, was especially 
"close" to Indian interests in his district. In 1827, he wrote a letter to Puno's 
Prefecto inquiring about what to do about a judicial ruling that—as he knew— 
was taking away communal land from aparcialidad: 
"Yesterday the secretary of the judicial court carne to see me and showed me a 
court sentence by which I am supposed to hand the plots of Rumitia, Totorani, 
Cañoyo, Cañinima, and others to Da. Juana Sollana. This means that the named 
Mrs. Sollana will get a hold of most of the lands of a whole parcialidad of tributaries. 
I do not think this should happen. My community absolutely opposes this decision 
and I tliink that I must oppose it and join the community's protest. If I do otherwise, 
my Indians will think I am not defending their interests, and that for some 
self-interests I am not defending them but handing out their lands. So, I want to 
ask you, whether I could avoid this confrontation".50 
Agramonte talked about "his" Indians, and wanted to help. However, the Prefecto 
answered (on November 27,1827) that he should follow the judicial order, and 
that the Indians—if they had complaints—should claim their rights in a lawsuit. 
Thus, paradoxically, the Gobernadores' success to control peasant resources 
depended on the defense of these same resources against the state, the Prefecto, 
other Gobernadores, and local hacendados. Without the "ethnic legitimacy" 
component, the Gobernadores fulfilled a similar role to Indian curacas or caciques 
in the course of the colonial period (Spalding, 1985). In this role, the Gobernadores 
leamed lessons of downward and upward political manipulation. Upwards because 
they increasingly needed the repressive mechanisms an alliance with Subprefectos, 
Prefectos, and the state could provide; downwards because to be economically 
successíul they needed to access peasant resources. As for colonial caciques, this 
50  "Se apersonado en este el Secretario de la Corte de Justicia con Decreto de aquella para que Yo le de pocesion 
como á Apoderado de Da. Juana Solíanos de las tierras de Rumitia, Totorani, Cañoyo, Cañinima, y las demas 
que tasan [?] sus papeles, demodo que casi de una parte ó de todas de una Parcialidad de Contribuyentes seva 
haser dueña la referida Sra. A mi me parece nada regular y mi [!] comunidad esta muy opuesta y Yo creo que 
devo en cumplimiento de mi cargo Oponerme en consorcio de ellos y por ello bea VS si puedo excimirme dela 
tal comicion por que me anuncia que tal bes presuman mis Yndios el que Yo por algun interes particular, lejos 
de defenderlos proceda a la entrega..."., APPu, document 463. 1827. 
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was a dangerous game. In the first decades after Independence, Gobernadores 
successfully strenghtened their power, in part because the state's fiscal eye lay on 
the Subprefectos, and these largely depended on the Gobernadores' 
interdependence with hilacatas and segundas. Peasants responding in part to 
conviction and in part to pressure in turbulent political circumstances relied on 
their Gobernadores, especially when caciques were no longer around. For the 
time being, Gobernadores' pace of accumulation, based on the collection of tribute, 
accelerated. However, quickly changing perceptions altered such optimistic 
outlooks. 
In the wake of the second wave of Subprefectos' persecution—that is, after the 
immediate effects of the Wars of Independence had been overcome, when 
demographic recovery was evident, and economic growth was palpable, many of 
the subtle mechanisms Gobernadores used to enhance their expanding power 
position surfaced and carne under scrutiny. This intricate power game is best 
illustrated in a detailed case involving none less than Domingo Choquehuanca, 
who since 1834, was the Subprefecto of Huancané. The Choquehuanca's had 
not supported Tupac Amaru II in 1780 (Ramos, 1982:56), and the king rewarded 
their loyalty by allowing them to retain power, Indians, and tributes. In 1835, the 
Choquenuancas supported Santa Cruz and the Confederation. Nevertheless, in 
1838 the Contaduría urged him to pay his contribuciones debts dating back to 
1834.51 In spite of his debts, he continued as Subprefecto until 1838, when he left to 
become senator for Puno. Huancané's new interim Subprefecto, Antolín 
Guerrero, fíled suit against Choquehuanca to delimit his responsibilities from those 
of Choquehuanca concerning the contribuciones for the San Juan semester of 
1838. The total due amount for this semester were 23.119 pesos and 5 1 /2 reales, 
and Choquehuanca still owed 15.755 pesos and 5 reales. Once the debt amount 
was established, the Contaduría decreed an embargo of Choquehuanca's hacienda 
Checayani and imposed a 60 percent penalty on the owed amount. Checayani's 
value did not cover the amount of the outstanding tribute and the penalty. The 
Contaduría requested that Puno's Prefecto intervene to accelerate the process, 
but the Prefecto remained silent out of a longstanding friendship to Choquehuanca. 
The Contaduría never received the property titles of Checayani; the hacienda 
could not be auctioned. Although the Contaduría was unsuccessful in reclaiming 
5 1     APPu, document 13-367. 
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Choquehuanca's debt, the file against him continued its legal course. The 
Gobernadores of Conima and Moho were called into testify against Choquehuanca 
and inform what liad happened to the contribuciones in their respective districts. 
Still, in 1839 the debts remained unpaid and the embargo on hold. By then, the 
Contaduría concluded—following many similar experiences—that the tribute 
money "liad been invested in matters alien to its purposes".52 Choquehuanca, 
now in Congress in Lima at this point "disappears'' from the local political scenario. 
His "disappearance" encouraged his local enemies to speak up. Cipriano Figueroa 
from Ynchupalla, the former Gobernador from Huancané, Antolín Guen-ero (in 
1839 the interim new Subprefecto of Huancané), and the Gobernadores from 
Conima and Moho, Celedonio and Paulino Machicado, all were now willing to 
defend themselves against Choquehuanca's allegations that it liad been them who 
had not delivered the due contribución amounts. Guen-ero used his interimship to 
align the other Gobernadores, but not for long. They, as had Choquehuanca, 
supported Santa Cruz. When the Confederation was defeated, the Mariscal lost 
power, and the Prefectos, Subprefectos, and Gobernadores he had nominated 
were replaced, and their properties seized. Guerrero lost his hacienda Condoraque 
and the hacienda Halla—of which he was the arrendatario. The owner of Halla 
was Mariano Figueroa, the father of the former Gobernador of Ynchupalla.53 In 
the new power constellation Mariano Figueroa's claims were dismissed, he lost 
Halla. In 1840, a new lawsuit for unpaid contribuciones for the semester of San 
Juan 1839 against Antolín Guerrero (the interim Subprefecto), and the new 
Subprefecto of Huancané, Mariano Toledo was presented in court. This time the 
new Prefecto interevened and threatened to go after the fiadores of both 
Subprefectos. When he did, it turned out that the fiadores were the former 
Gobernadores, the Machicado brothers, a José María Morales, and Isidro 
Belarde54 In 1841, there was still another Subprefecto, Simón Aguirre. But, he 
too, renounced shortly after his nomination, because in Vilquechico, Antolín 
Guerrero, using his prestige as former interim Subprefecto and Gobernador "was 
able to congregate several bandits and desertors and other imbecile Indians, to 
steal all the fiscal money". Guerrero escaped together with Isidro Belarde, one of 
the prosecuted guarantors because of the debts imputed to Subprefecto Toledo.55 
52  APPu, document B-372.  53  
APPu. document B-374. 
54 APPu, document 461. 
55 APPu. document 463. 
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Intricate power relations revolved around the contribuciones; factional cleavages 
weakened or became stronger depending on the general polítical climate but more 
so on the building of alliances with other Gobernadores and Subprefectos, and 
hacienda owners, the fiadores. In this case, several Subprefectos and Gobernadores 
alternated in holding power positions in spite of the fact that they all supported one 
political leader: Santa Cruz. Accessing tribute payments and delimiting fiscal 
responsibilities was more important than ideological outlooks to explain provincial 
intraelite confrontations. The direct assault on fiscal revenues by Antolín Guerrero 
after his ousting describes the stakes involved. 
All this did not happen in a social vacuum. Indian peasants were victims and 
witnesses to these fights, and observing they gained a sense of what the "new" 
Republican state was all about. The fears expressed by Cabanilla's Gobernador, 
Agramonte, that Indians perceived he was not defending their interests but his 
interests, was exactly what Indian peasants leamed from observing the changing 
faces of their Gobernadores. 
PEASANTS' REACTIONS 
Before, during, and after the Wars of Independence, the words 'Republic' and 
'citizen' were in everyone's mouth, but the meaning of these words, and its 
implications, were interpreted quite differently depending on the circumstances 
and individual opinions. The questions about who the new citizens were, and about 
their rights and obligations, had a crucial impact on how power and the right to 
exercise power was defined. The overarching liberal notion that the sovereignty of 
the nation "resides with the people" ("residía en el pueblo"), the Alcalde of Azángaro 
patronized in 1827 was crushingly criticized by the regidores of the same municipality. 
The Regidores understood that looking at things that way was a "flagrant mistake" 
("torpe error"), more so because of the context in which the Alcalde had made his 
statement: he was justifying his attempt to convene a popular court against an 
Intendente deemed inept. In the Regidores' opinion this was a dangerous move. 
One could not trust the pueblo; democracy—they claimed—was for intelligent, 
notforignorant people.56 Following the Regidores' call, the same year, the Prefecto 
56  APPu, document 278. 
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of Puno deemed it necessary to intervene in defining his subaltems' obligations, 
duties, and convictions. They were individually invited to talk to him in his office 
despacho).57 Tlie contení of tliese unrecorded conversations surfaced in the events 
and reactions that followed. 
A key message of the Prefecto was not to resort to Indian participation in defíning 
anything political, that is, not to build upon their support to introduce any changes. 
The fear of an Indian uprising emerging from their participation was latent in people's 
minds. Inviting Indians to particípate and making promises to tliem was equivalent 
10 show Indians they had power, and empowered Indians represented a threat to 
an already threatened political stability. 
In the district of Chamaca lived the Indians of Llallagua in three ayllus. Earlier they 
had sided with Tupac Amaru II. In 1827, the Gobernador of Chamaca, Macedo, 
used his good standing with the Llallagua Indians to reaffirm himself as Gobernador, 
and to oust the local priest who had complained about him to the Prefecto. The 
priest complained that the Gobernador had provoked an Indian uproar in the 
doctrina because he told Indians that priests were despots and that they only 
preached to become rich. Moreover, the Gobernador had told the Indians not to 
pay ecclesiastical fees because these fees were sheer extorsion. Indicating that 
"the custom to serve" had been abolished and that from now on Indians were free 
persons, the priest was left with no herders to take care of his sheep. To counter 
the priest's accusations, the Gobernador summoned the Segundas from Llallagua 
in his house, where they wrote and signed a letter protesting any attempt to unseat 
the Gobernador. Tellingly, Macedo was "retired" in May 1827.58 To resort to 
Indian help was considered "dangerous", and it was even worse when this 
participation was paralleled by a discourse on liberty, freedom, and resistance to 
exactions or free services. The second message of Puno's Prefecto was that the 
state needed the Indian tribute, even if for the sake of efficiency, justice or the 
ideals of citizenship had to be put aside. 
In 1840, the Indians from the province of Azángaro were willing to pay 14 reales 
each as anticipated tribute of the Christmas semester. They gave the money to 
their respective Gobernadores, the Gobernadores turned the money over to the 
57  APPu. document 279.         58  
APPu.documents 257, 263. 
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Subprefecto, who in turn entered it to the Tesorería. This payment was meant as a 
loan. However, soon after they had paid, the same Indians were knocking at the 
Subprefecto's door, day after day, to get their money back or obtain an 
acknowledgement of the state's debt toward them. The reason for this reaction 
was that in spite of their anticipated payment expressing their good will toward the 
state, they were requested to forward additional payments. As Indian pressure 
mounted, the Subprefecto requested that the Tesorería return the 4.156 pesos 
owed to the Indians, or that alternatively someone else become Subprefecto. He 
was willing to relinquish his position because he feai'ed that Indians were close to 
a rebellion that could cost him his life.59 
Athird important message of the Prefecto was that the state's and the Tesorería's 
efforts to prosecute Gobernadores and Subprefectos for unpaid contributions 
should be handled with utmost caution. Lawsuits against local powerholders could 
not be hidden from the public eye, changing exactions were the peasants' 
thermomether of tribute-conflicts. When peasants sensed conflict their suspicions 
grew and their willingness to pay diminished. Moreover, they, much better than the 
Tesorería, knew what Gobernadores and Subprefectos did with the tributes (and 
all other payments) they received or managed to gain access to. 
In more than one occasion Indian peasants observed how money they paid was 
"redirected". Funds that had benefitted them during the colonial period, were 
insistently drawn upon to pay for war efforts, and — as peasants knew — also 
sifted into the pockets of local powerholders. Bienes de comunidad and the 
tomin were no longer used to help Indians pay their tributes, although the rhetoric 
persisted. Puno's Tesorería chief administrator wrote in 1827: 
"...we know for sure that by now more than 6.000 pesos are in the hands of the 
Gobernadores of the province of Chucuito from the tributes Indian have been 
paying now that the govemment has lowered their due contributions. Since these 
funds are meant to benefit Indians, I urge you [the Prefecto] to order the Intendente 
to collect these funds immediately and send them to the Tesorería".60 
59 APPu, Asillo, February 7, 1840. And other indicators of mounting pressure are in APPu, 368-380. 
60 APPu, Administrador del Tesoro Público de Puno al Prefecto, 26/11/1827, B-205. Also sec, AGN, 
O.L. 163:1335, Estado de los ingresos que en cada año constituyen el Ramo de Hacienda en esta 
Tesorería de Puno y las erogaciones lijas, 21/10/1827 "...de los seis mil y mas pesos que con evidencia 
sabemos eccisten en poder de los gobernadores de la Provincia de Chucuito pertenecientes a los fondos 
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In other words, the state had lowered the contribución as an incentive for payment 
The funds were urgently needed and their investment vaguely stated ("obras 
particulares de su particular beneficencia pública"). However, the "particular 
beneficencia pública", was now more a "particular beneficencia privada". During 
the colonial period Indians had communally owned funds (bienes de comunidad) to 
subsidize their mita obligations in Potosí, which in turn helped them pay their 
tributes to the colonial state. After Independence, some Indian communities 
requested that funds and tributes meant to benefit them, be redirected to build and 
keep up schools. In Huancané, Intendente Aguirre suggested to pay for the 
maintenance of its school with the rents from five communal haciendas in Ynchupalla, 
and one in Lipichicarca. These "communal haciendas" had been built by the Jesuits 
on land belonging to Indians, and their rents helped to pay the maintenance of a 
tailoring workshop and to cover expenses for the mita of Potosí. According to his 
report, the annual rent of the six haciendas in the past had been 214 pesos. By a 
decree issued in August 1825 the rents from these haciendas had been assigned to 
pay hospitals and municipal expenses [mantenimiento de los ramos de hospitales y 
de propios y arbitrios].61 Then, they were used to cover war expenses ["corrían 
aplicados a las necesidades de la guerra"] which meant that the workshop was in 
decay and the teachers received no salaries. When Intendente Aguirre presented 
his suggestions for the schools from the six haciendas only two were left (Sivicani y 
Lacalaca), but they produced a 1.500 pesos annual rent and had llamas, sheep, and 
a few cows. Half of this amount went to the four churches in Juli, the other half went 
to the Tesorería. Two additional fincas, one in La Paz and another in Larecaja, which 
had belonged to the same ecclesiastical jurisdication before the wars, now with 
the creation of the national boundary between Peru and Bolivia had an even more 
uncertain destiny, and no one knew in which shape they were.62 To rescue some 
Indian rights Intendente Aguirre invoked colonial legislation (Libro Sexto de la 
Recopilacion de Indias, titulo 4to., ley 13) by which "la plata que resultase de los 
vienes, censos y renta de comunidad, se ha de gastar solamente en lo que se 
dirijiese al descanso y alivio de los indios, y convirtiese en su probecho y utilidad". 
Now, whatever was left from the rents of these communal haciendas went to the 
que aquellos Indígenas van depositando con la rebaja de su Contribucion para las obras particulares de su 
particular beneficencia publica, sírvase V.S. mandar que el Sor. Intendente los colecte y remita sin la mas leve 
demora...". 
61  APPu, document B-270. 
62  APPu. Pedro Miguel de Urbina. intendente de Chucuito al Prefecto. Chucuito, 01/08/1825. 
45 
FRONTERAS • No. 4 / VOL. 4 / 1999 • 
church, and a former Gobernador kept the money obtained from renting pasture 
land [rentas de yerbajes] which earlier had been used to pay the teacher. The 
fincas of Pasana-Ccollo and Guando, and the pastures from Hanccoamani and 
Guaicuyo, located in Lampa, still produced an annual rent of 490 pesos. 
Aguirre's insistence on keeping Indian lands and produce for the benefit of Indians, 
reinforced the idea that the state should not allow these funds to be "redirected", 
and this, as seen above, sometimes was simply another argument to withhold 
funds from the state. Similar claims carne from Gobernador Pablo Pimentel in 
Orurillo in 1840.63 With some notable exceptions,64 the wars and the various and 
often contradictory decrees dismantled traditional Indian rights. Indians watched 
their schools and workshops close down for the lack of funds. Fund reallocation 
often occurred in the name of a war, and was part of the initial experiences of the 
Indian popuíation vis a vis the new Republican state that fought wars that never 
seemed to end. 
Parallel to these observations, Indians also watched the quick turnover of their 
Gobernadores. Following the whims of the civil wars that followed the Wars of 
Independence, more than once, Indian peasants were requested to pay their tribute 
to each new incoming Gobernador. Often, they had already paid the due semester 
amount to the predecessor, or so they claimed. The familiarity that underlied the 
obligation to pay tribute was disrupted by rapid face changes. 
In February 1839, one month before the Santa Cruz's Confederacion was defeated, 
the Estado Sud-Peruano requested that the Gobernadores collect tribute from 
Indians due only in July. The anticipated tribute payments ran against custom and 
possibility, and foreseeably, the Gobernadores could only sent in portions of the 
tribute from their districts. When, one month later, new Gobernadores carne to 
power they immediately set out to collect tribute. However, Indians reminded 
them that a portion of the due tribute had been already paid to their predecessors, 
 
63  APPu. Informe de Pablo Pimentel, gobernador de Orurillo al Prefecto. Orurillo, 14/04/1840.             
64  On February 9, 1835. the Presidencia de la Honorable Municipalidad of the city of Lampa informed the Prefecto 
that all materials for the girls" school had been paid for with bienes de comunidad administered by Anselmo 
Arze. Since at least 1833 the Prefectura had helped toward paying the costos of maintaining the school. and in 
1835 the municipality requested that the Prefectura continue doing so. APPu, 1835:470. As the school was 
located in the city of Lampa, 1 suspect that the girls attending the school were the daughters of the vecinos, not 
of Indians. 
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and only paid what they saw fit, "porque son los únicos que ha podido reunirse a 
causa de que han adelantado a mi antecesor segun me indican".65 The 
instability-argument—obvious to everyone — was used by peasants and 
Gobernadores to skip payments to the state. 
In a last effort to create the Confederación, Santa Cruz attempted to massively 
mobilize the Indian population in the South.66 The General en Jefe del Ejército del 
Sur requested help from caciques and Gobernadores to form montoneras in each 
pueblo to repel Bolivian military incursions. Indians enrolled in the montoneras 
would be exempted from tribute payments during the war, and could keep whatever 
they took away from the Bolivian army. Those Indians who stayed in their pueblos 
were requested to hide their cattle in order to avoid that these resources fall into 
Bolivianhands.67 This active involvement made tribute collection even more difficult 
and blurred. As during the Wars of Independence, peasant resources were 
consumed but went unpaid. By April 1839, there were no more cabalgaduras: 
"'despues de la consumación que han ocacionado los transitos frecuentes del Ejercito 
inbasor Boliviano [y...] en la actualidad las tropas Nacionales hasen uso de multitud 
de Bagages con que de un pueblo a otro se les auxilia en clase de carga consejil.". 
Even worse, animals taken from peasants were lost or simply not returned to their 
owners. This led to "discredit the goverment and the resentment against the Peruvian 
cause, because the Indians are the most narrowminded of all, as they are only 
interested in their own private interests".68 
In spite of Indians' defense of their prívate interests, some Gobernadores managed 
to get hold of peasant resources. In 1839, the Indians of Llalli complained against 
their Gobernador, Don Isidro Mendoza: 
"...nos oprime en tal estremo de esponernos a notables resultados [...] Con motivo 
de ser arrendatarios en una Hacienda nominada Chacha [ubicada en las "goteras" 
de los linderos de la parcialidad] con el disfraz de daños de sus pastos toma 
6 5     APPu, documcnt B-373. 
66    CDIR t. XVI. Archivo Riva Agüero, p.894. Carta de Santa Cruz a Riva Agüero. Cusco, 13/09/1838. 
 "Dar impulso a la guerra popular que prepara nuestros triunfos". 
67 APPu. General del Ejército del Sur al Subprcfecto de Lampa. Lampa, 01/12/1841.                            
68  APPu. 05/04/1839. ["causando el descredito del Govierno y la odiosidad de la causa del Peru, porque la 
clase indígena mas mesquina que otra cualquiera parece que no tiene otro idolo que el de su interes 
particular"]. 
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nuestros ganados, los obejunos, los señala, con la que acostumbra interpolar estas 
en su tropa [y] son irreclamables; los Bacunos, depositandolos en el interior de su 
Hacienda y no pagando los dueños dos reales por cabesa no Salen de alli; los 
caballos, y demas bestias son tomadas por el o su encargado con esta patraña 
para su servicio de modo que arruinadas las bota".69 
Amidst the war, this Gobernador was not taking animals from peasants to support 
a war. The animals augmented his own prívate herd, and the money the Gobernador 
obtained from "kidnapping" Indians' beasts went into his pockets. By denouncing 
the Gobernador, the índians from Llalli showed the "narrow-mindedness" of local 
powerholders, an attitude that had forced them to abandon their pueblo. To prove 
their accusations, the índians of Llalli requested to file a lawsuit against the 
Gobernador. We do not know what happened in this case, but in other places 
such indictments led to the Gobernador's replacement. In a similar complaint, the 
índians from Pucará, ousted their Gobernador, Don Manuel Víctor Zenon Ramos, 
"por los abusos, estafas, y tropelías que ha cometido en su destino".70 
During periods of war, when the pressures on peasant resources mounted and the 
state "carne closer" the tensions between peasants and Gobernadores increased, 
and gave peasants an opportunity to get rid of greedy Gobernadores often by 
showing that when it carne to demonstrate patriotism or loyalty peasants were less 
"narrowminded" than Gobernadores or Subprefectos. Santa Cruz understood 
the message and noted that, montoneras and guerrilla leaders lacked the enthusiasm 
he had observed among them during the Wars of Independence, when often these 
same people had fought against Spaniards.71 During the years of the 
Confederación, a process of selection in the ranks of local powerholders occurred, 
depending on the ability a Gobernador had to realign himself with the changing 
political winds (together with Subprefectos and Prefectos), and/or with Iridian 
peasants. Power was manipulated—with unequal success—in both directions.The 
initial closeness between Gobernadores and índians was eroded by the war, and 
by índians observing that the war provided their Gobernadores with a possibility 
of personal enrichment. As aconsequence, Gobernadores could rely less on índians 
to assert their positions and gain income, and had to rely more on coercion. To 
69  APPu. Los indios de Llalli contra el gobernador. 06/1839; 307. 
70  APPu. Francisco Montesinos, Juzgado de Primer Instancia al Prefecto. 11/11/1839. 
71  DIP, t. XVI. Archivo Riva Agüero. Comunicación de Santa Cruz a Riva Agüero. Cusco, 29/09/1838. 
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exert coercion the Gobernadores needed to turn to the upper echelons of state 
power, the Subprefectos and Prefectos, especially when military or police 
intervention was required. 
Increasingly Indians resisted to pay. After three years of war during the 
Confederación, the Indians from Huancané who had been willing to help transport 
"pertrechos, panes, zapatos, cebada en grano, y otros" during the fight against the 
Chileans, insistently requested that their 31 donkeys be returned to them, and 
resisted continuing to pay the contribución ["...aun la contribución no quieren 
pagar".]. Resistance to pay and the devastation brought about by the war made it 
difficult for Gobernadores to collect the contribución. During the Wars of 
Independence there had been difficulties as well; what was new one decade later 
was Indians' resistance to pay.72 This was a frightening message for those who 
had greatly benefitted from the Indian tribute and believed that involving Indians in 
anything political was a threat to political stability. 
The clearer it became that the Confederación was an unviable political and military 
undertaking, the more the Gobernadores retreated from the political scenario. To 
avoid the mounting requests for resources and money they were increasingly unable 
(or unwilling) to provide, the Gobernadores abandoned their pueblos. The "enemies" 
knew that these positions were crucial and quickly sought a repíacement to get a 
hold of tribute payments. The new Gobernadores had even less support from 
Indians, and often did not know local conditions. As one observer put it, 
Gobernadores [mandatarios] were now "algunos mozos insignificantes", rejected 
by Indians and vecinos.73 Political positions lost credence, and many displaced or 
hiding Gobernadores survived the war by continuing with their commercial 
businesses, but without the benefit of their direct access to capital,the contribución. 
In October 1840, Chucuito s Subprefecto, Joaquín Lizardo, commented that 
72  Already in 1835 Azangaro's Subprefecto, D. Mariano Joaquín Urviola, in a letter to the Prefecto informed that 
he had not reccived contribucion payments from the Gobernadores in his province, "because of the great 
misery and poverty of the Indians in this province". And he added that "he could not biame the Gobernadores 
because a l l  efforts only led to very small payments*'. APPu, Subprefecto al Prefecto, Azángaro, 14/12/1835: 
380..."no puedo culpar a los Gobernadores por que bien veo que estos en vano se esfuerzan puesto que los 
cobradores haciendo los mayores sacrificios contribuyen en las mas pequeñas sumas". 
73  BN, D 1714, Proyecto de operaciones de una tropa ligera, que se puede hacer por las inmediaciones de Vilque, 
Cabanilla y Lampa, presentado al Sor. General. Arequipa. 14/02/1842. Some vecinos ventured to take some 
"mozos insignifcantes" prisoner..." ban capturados por los vecinos sin que puedan remediarlo". 
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síndicos, priests, and Gobernadores "far from doing their job as mandated by law, 
have completely retreated using banal pretexts, have gone far away, or are 
dedicated to their own commercial speculations".74 
In a sense then, peasants' resistance to pay tribute based on the recognition of 
their misuse of it, eliminated the local representatives of the state. Reports on local 
conditions portrayed a general decay in Puno: 
"...today everything is in ruins because the war left the fundos without laborers, the 
city workshops are empty, and those who are still there do not pay. Nobody is 
paying anything".75 
Lack of labor and money was the message summed up by the Ministerio de 
Hacienda when interpreting the many petitions and descriptions coming from the 
provinces. Capital became extremely expensive, "las usuras han subido a un punto 
el mas escandaloso, solo buenos para sorberse los ultimos restos que han quedado 
en mano de uno que otro propietario".76 
The church also lamented economic disaster and—more generally—the moral 
consequences of the war.77 In answering a request of Lima's Archbishop to make an 
inventory of all ecclesiastical possessions around the mid-1840s, local informants 
revealed the deplorable conditions that had resulted from the war: 
74 APPu. Subprefecto de Chucuito Joaquín Lizardo al Prefecto. 02/10/1840: 428... "lejos de dedicarse a 
llenar los mandatos que les consigna la ley, se retraen absolutamente, ya eludiéndose con pretextos 
infinitos ya ausentandose a largas distancias, e ya en fin por contraerse esclusivamenle a sus especulaciones 
comerciales". 
75 AGN. Ministerio de Hacienda. O.L. 282:1-25a. expedientes y solicitudes. Expedientes Civiles. 1840. 
"Hoy todo esta reducido a ruina; pues los fundos rústicos, sobre las calamidades producidas por tanta 
guerra desoladora, ya casi carecen de brazos para su labor. Los urbanos que por desgracia no se hallan en 
el mejor lugar de la ciudad, se mantienen vacíos, y si ocupados no pagan, y estan sugetos a litigios por 
su naturaleza no es la menor desgracia; y, por ultimo, principales impuestos en los fondos publicos, y a 
mutuo en particulares que todos han fracasado, y lodo junto presenta un cuadro bien lastimoso". 
76 AGN., ibid. Comments forwarded by Francisco Moreyra y Matute to the Ministro de Hacienda in 1840, 
reveal the meaning of the local decay for the Peruvian state: "Por fin se ha perdido ya el equilibrio que 
mantenia el orden y el concierto, y en que consiste la riqueza de los estados que es el valor del dinero y 
el producto de las propiedades, desnivelandose de tal modo, que ya falta esa armonía y justa proporcion, 
que precisamente arrastra consigo la ruina y destruccion general". 
77 AA, Comunicaciones de Curas, L3, 1712-1843. 
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" In the wake of the revolution and amidst great disorder many usurpations have 
occurred, and the people who enjoy properties that do not rightfully belong to 
them are allowed to keep them, because of the many changes the country has 
suffered, the little consistency of prevailing laws, and the general uproar. All this 
has slowly made reality unrecognizable [and] has completely perverted any 
sentiments of honesty".78 
Disorder, poverty, and lack of resources were rampant. But all this together had 
changed local power constellations, justified the abolition of all reform attempts, 
and maintained the tribute payments. Had Paulding remained in Puno all these 
years, he would have understood Gulcán's Gobernador s resilience to accept his 
money. 
78   AA, Comunicaciones de Curas. L3. 1712-1843/1846. "en el curso de la rebolucion y en medio de los 
desordenes producidos por el desarreglo de la rebolucion se han efectuado muchas usurpaciones, y las 
personas que disfrutan de bienes ágenos cuentan con la permanencia de sus ilegitimas adquisiciones por que 
las mutaciones del pais. la poca consistencia de sus Leyes, y la agitacion de los espíritus, al paso que han ido 
envolviendo las cosas en tinieblas impenetrables han avivado [y] pervertido los sentimientos de honradez". 
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